ArmoredD.com

Andrey Frolov

Source:  Moscow Defense Brief

In 2007 Russia’s national defence procurement (NDP) amounted to 302.7 billion rubles (app. $11.6 billion), which marks an increase of 27.9% over 2006. Of this sum, $5.6 billion (47.9%) will be spent on purchases of new equipment, $2.3 billion (19.8%) on repairs and modernization, and $3.7 billion (32.2%) on R&D. Appropriations for purchases, repairs and modernization, and R&D grew by 25.5%, 23.6% and 34.4%, respectively.

NDP-2007 includes purchases of new equipment and the continuation of long-term programs begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter consists mostly of Navy projects, given their high cost and relatively long production cycles, when compared to the equipment of other services. Published data tends to support official statements that mass purchases of serially-produced items are planned, especially with regard to the Navy, though the scale of such purchases remains rather low.

Significant sums (41% of the sum, reserved for purchasing of the new equipment) have also been allocated to repairs and modernization. Given the Defence Ministry’s tradition of procuring new equipment for its strategic nuclear forces, most of funds assigned to repairs and modernization will be devoted to conventional weaponry. In 2007, the strategic forces will acquire 17 land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) – a post-Soviet record, according to published information – finance the construction of three ballistic nuclear missile submarines and acquire new strategic bomber.

There is virtually no information on purchases of weaponry, for the air force and navy above all. Taking account of the high price of modern weapons systems, which one can estimate on the basis of export contracts, it is likely that the share of such purchases in absolute and relative terms is quite large.

It is interesting to compare NDP‑2007 with the State Program of Armaments for 2007—2015 (SPA-2015). The latter allocates $190 billion, of which the Defence Ministry should provide $173.5 billion, including $109.2 billion. for the purchase of new arms and equipment at constant 2006 prices. This sets appropriations for arms and equipment in 2007 at 5.1% of the overall spending planned to 2015, or about half of the proportion that would have to be spent equally over the next eight years (11.1%) to match the forecast of SPA‑2015. The gap between the relative percentage allocated to purchases of new arms and equipment is evident with 63% for SPA‑2015 and just 47.9% for NDP‑2007. These figures could be related to the tendency to reduce “inertial” purchases, i.e., the completion of long drawn-out projects, some dating to Soviet times and requiring repairs even before the completion of construction, and the simultaneous growth of “innovative” projects, i.e., the rising number of newly-acquired weapons systems. Indeed, it is clear that purchases of arms and equipment purchases is set to increase by 2010. The number of long drawn-out projects will be also be reduced by administrative action; for example, the fitting-out of the Project 949AM cruise-missile nuclear submarine at Sevmash was rejected in 2006 and not included in NDP‑2007.

Finally, NDP‑2007 marks the threshold of a new practice for the arms-procurement system: from 2008 the national defence procurement will be defined for a three-year period.

The tables below show only known purchases of arms and military equipment for the Russian armed forces, not including purchases for law enforcement and security agencies like the Interior Ministry, the Federal Security Service and others. Published orders for repairs and modernization are also included, but R&D contracts are not.